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EQUITY IN AMERICAN AND JEWISH LAW 
Itzchak E. Kornfeld, Ph.D.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the subject of equity in the laws of the 
United States and in Jewish law.1  The equitable principles and 
remedies in the law of the United States are rooted in the common law 
of England.  Their origins are more fully elaborated upon below.  The 
equitable principles in Jewish law, as established in the Talmud, 
specifically in the Mishna and Gemara, are rooted in the Torah,2 which 
 
* Ph.D. (Law), The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.  General Counsel and V.P. M.E. J. 
Transboundary Development, Ltd., Israel. This article is dedicated to Rabbi Aaron HaCohen 
Gold and to Bella and Ben Schepsman, as well as to the memories of Rabbi Aaron 
Kirschenbaum and R. Avraham Moshe Kornfeld.  I wish to thank the editors of the Touro Law 
Review for their excellent editorial assistance, particularly during the COVID19 
pandemic/plague.  
1  See Amihai Radzyner, Between Scholar and Jurist: The Controversy Over the Research 
of Jewish Law Using Comparative Methods at the Early Time of the Field, 23 J.L. & RELIG. 
189 (2007); Assaf Likhovski, The Invention of “Hebrew Law” in Mandatory Palestine, 46 
AM. J. COMP. L. 339 (1998); Michael Walzer, The Legal Codes of Ancient Israel, 4 Yale J.L. 
& HUMAN 335 (1992) (explaining the various codes); Izahk Englard, The Problem of Jewish 
Law in a Jewish State, 3 ISR. L. REV 254 (1968), 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/ 
9B0B61FD5AACEC17F1BE174A387E9DEB/S0021223700001424a.pdf/ 
problem_of_jewish_law_in_a_jewish_state.pdf.   
With the increasing tendency in Israel to replace the old Ottoman civil 
law, the familiar question of the reception of Jewish (sic) (talmudic) law 
has once again become the subject of lively discussion . . .The forceful 
demand “to base the laws of the State on the Halacha” comes especially 
from the religious parties. [Footnote omitted]  But representatives of the 
nonreligious parties also recommend the reception of Jewish law in those 
areas of private law [Footnote omitted] where no decisions on ideological 
grounds need to be made. 
Id. at 254.  The term “Halakha” refers to the collective body of Judaism’s religious law, i.e., 
rabbinic law, which includes the Torah, the Talmud, established rabbinic decisions, and 
customary law.  Michael Walzer, The Legal Codes of Ancient Israel, 4 Yale J.L. & HUMAN 
335 (1992). 
2  The Torah is the name that the Rabbis and Jewish people for millennia refer to as the Five 
Books of Moses (Old Testament), or the Pentateuch, the Greek for five.  GEORGETOWN 
1
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is divided into two separate parts: The written Torah, referred to in 
Hebrew as the “Torah Shebichtav” (literally translated from the 
Hebrew, as the “written Torah”), and the oral Torah, or “Torah 
Sheba’al Peh,” (literally translated from the Hebrew, as the “Torah in 
the mouth”).3  Jewish tradition holds that Moses received both at Mt. 
Sinai and that over the course of the Israelites’ forty-year trek through 
the desert, he imparted it to the people and that these were passed down 
through the generations.4 
The “Torah Shebichtav,” is comprised of the Tanakh5 or the 
Pentateuch (Five Book of Moses), the twenty-one books of the 
Prophets (beginning with Joshua and ending with Malachi), and the 
thirteen volumes of the “Ketuvim” or other writings, which include, 
the Psalms, Proverbs, Job, the Song of Songs and Chronicle I and II, 
for a total of thirty-nine volumes.6  The “Torah Sheba’al Peh,” 
encompasses the rules, interpretations, and explications of the Torahic 
laws, that were compiled and combined into the Mishna and Gemara, 
among others, following the destruction of the Second Temple in 
Jerusalem.  The latter are elaborated upon infra.  Suffice it to say, that 
a direct comparison between the procedural, or the substantive aspects 
of the common law of equity and that of Jewish law is not possible. 
Nevertheless, they both have similarities, particularly given 
equity’s character.  This fact will become quickly apparent to the 
reader, in the ensuing parts of the article.  Indeed, one major reason 
that a direct comparison between the two systems is not possible is 
primarily due to their dissimilar internal adjudicative logic.  Before 
 
UNIVERSITY, BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE AND WORLD AFFAIRS, HALAKHA, (2020) 
https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/halakha. 
3  The Oral Torah/Law expounds upon and explains what the laws of the Torah mean and 
how one is to follow them.  For example, the Torah declares in the Ten Commandments (in 
Hebrew Asseret Ha’Dibrot, or the ten statements) “Remember the Sabbath day, and keep it 
holy.”  Exodus 20:8-11; Deuteronomy 5:12-15.  The Oral Torah specifies what that means 
and, for instance, defines exactly what work is, as well as the how to go about fulfilling the 
Commandment.  See generally Rabbi Julian Sinclair, Torah Sheba’al Peh, THE JC (Mar. 6, 
2009), https://www.thejc.com/judaism/jewish-words/torah-sheba-al-peh-1.8061. 
4 Oral Torah vs. Written Torah, TORAH.ORG, https://torah.org/learning/basics-primer-torah-
oraltorah.  “Both have been with us, according to Jewish sources, for all of the past 3300 years.  
And without both, it is impossible to fully understand traditional Jewish teaching or thought.  
The Written Torah, (sic) mentions each of the Commandments, or Mitzvo[t], only in passing 
or by allusion.  The Oral Law fills in the gaps.” Id.  
5  The word “Tanakh” is an abbreviation of Torah, Neviim (Prophets), and Ketuvim. 
6  With regard to the volumes of the Tanakh, see generally Religion: The Tanakh, JEWISH 
VIRTUAL LIBRARY (2019), https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-tanakh-full-text.te. 
2
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setting off on the exploration of equity, in both traditions, I provide a 
road map to this piece. 
The article opens with Part II, a discussion of the common law 
of equity.  Part III defines equity in the English and American courts; 
includes a discussion of its origins; and includes case studies of 
equitable remedies, including the injunctions and specific 
performance.  Part IV addresses the Mishnaic Jewish law of equity, 
also providing cases or examples which include remedies.  By 
necessity, the Hebraic law portion will be more thorough, as the author 
believes that this subject matter is less familiar to most readers. 
II. COMMON-LAW EQUITY  
A. The Origins of the Common Law 
Following the Norman conquest of England in 1066,7 they 
introduced an entirely new legal system to govern the English.  The 
new law was noteworthy, as it fostered the subsequent growth of 
English law.  Indeed, the term ‘common law’ was established in the 
succeeding years, in order to denote the new system of legal principles 
founded by the English courts.  Moreover, the Norman Kings, who 
now ruled over England, also created the Courts of King’s Bench.8  
The decisions of the King’s Bench courts9 in interpreting various rights 
and obligations led to the dawning of the common law principles we 
 
7  The assault and occupation of Britain by the armies of Norman, Breton, Flemish, and 
French soldiers was led by William the Conqueror, the Duke of Normandy.  “The conquest 
saw the Norman elite replace that of the Anglo-Saxon and take over the country’s lands, [etc.]”  
Mark Cartwright, The Impact of the Norman Conquest of England, ANCIENT HISTORY 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.ancient.eu/article/1323/the-impact-of-the-
norman-conquest-of-england. 
8  Development of Equity in England, LEXUNIVERSE, GLOBAL LEGAL INFORMATION (2008), 
http://www.lexuniverse.com/trust-equity/uk/Development-of-Equity-in-England.html.  
9  Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court still maintains a King’s Bench jurisdiction.  The Court  
has the power to consider any case pending in a lower court and even some matters not pending 
in the courts when it sees the need to address an issue of “immediate public importance.”  
When it does so, the Supreme Court exercises its “King’s Bench power” or its power of 
“extraordinary jurisdiction” as provided by the Pennsylvania Constitution and Pennsylvania 
law; King’s Bench Power and Power of Extraordinary Jurisdiction: Can the Supreme Court 
Hear Any Case it Chooses?, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF PENNSYLVANIA COURTS, OFFICE OF 
COMMUNICATIONS (last revised Oct. 2013), http://www.pacourts.us/assets/files/setting-
2236/file-1741.pdf?cb=b40ffc. 
3
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employ today.10  Nevertheless, if a decision of a common-law court 
was found to be unfair or unjust, the litigant had a right granted to her, 
to petition the King or Queen directly, by means of a writ.  This 
 
10  See, e.g., Court of King’s Bench records 1200-1702, THE UNITED KINGDOM’S NATIONAL ARCHIVE, 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/help-with-your-research/research-guides/court-kings-
bench-records-1200-1600. 
What was the Court of the King’s Bench? 
The King’s Bench was the most senior criminal court in England for most 
of its existence, exercising supervisory jurisdiction over all inferior 
criminal courts.  It was based on the principle of pleas heard regularly and 
formally within the king’s immediate purview even if not always in his 
actual presence. 
The usual mechanism for bringing cases from local inferior courts to the 
King’s Bench was by means of a writ of certiorari (requiring the record to 
be sent to King’s Bench for review) obtained by an unsuccessful 
defendant. 
There was an on-going conflict between the King’s Bench and Common 
Pleas courts over their respective shares of civil litigation.  This was only 
settled after 1660.  However, the court’s close association with the king 
meant it was superior to Common Pleas, taking from it cases where error 
was alleged. 
The case law, or common law, was originated by both the King’s Bench and Common Pleas 
in England, during the 13th and 14th centuries.  See generally ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF 
THE COMMON LAW (2010); THEODORE FRANK THOMAS PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE 
COMMON LAW (5th ed. 1956).  Note that for some 460 years (1200 – 1640), both courts issued 
case law judgments on their own.  These opinions would have needed to be merged. 
4
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procedure was similar to those employed by both Moses11 and King 
Solomon.12 
 
11  Exodus 18:13 – 23, BIBLE GATEWAY (New International Version), https://www.bible 
gateway.com/passage/?search=Exodus+18&version=NIV: 
13The next day Moses took his seat to serve as judge for the people, and 
they stood around him from morning till evening.14  When his father-in-
law saw all that Moses was doing for the people, he said, “What is this 
you are doing for the people? Why do you alone sit as judge, while all 
these people stand around you from morning till evening?” 
15Moses answered him, “Because the people come to me to seek God’s 
will.16  Whenever they have a dispute, it is brought to me, and I decide 
between the parties and inform them of God’s decrees and instructions.” 
17Moses’ father-in-law replied, “What you are doing is not good.18  You 
and these people who come to you will only wear yourselves out. The 
work is too heavy for you; you cannot handle it alone.19  Listen now to me 
and I will give you some advice, and may God be with you. You must be 
the people’s representative before God and bring their disputes to him.20  
Teach them his decrees and instructions, and show them the way they are 
to live and how they are to behave.21  But select capable men from all the 
people—men who fear God, trustworthy men who hate dishonest gain—
and appoint them as officials over thousands, hundreds, fifties and tens.22  
Have them serve as judges for the people at all times, but have them bring 
every difficult case to you; the simple cases they can decide themselves. 
That will make your load lighter, because they will share it with you.23  If 
you do this and God so commands, you will be able to stand the strain, 
and all these people will go home satisfied.” (emphasis added). 
12  1 Kings 3:16-27 ; The Brilliant Wisdom of King Solomon (Baruch C. Cohen trans., 1998), 
https://www.jlaw.com/Commentary/solomon.html.  
Two women [prostitutes,] came to King Solomon and stood before him.  
One woman (#1) said: ‘My Lord, this woman and I dwell in the same 
house, and I gave birth to a child while with her in the house.  On the third 
day after I gave birth, she also gave birth.  We live together; there is no 
outsider with us in the house; only the two of us were there.  The son of 
this woman died during the night because she lay upon him.  She arose 
during the night and took my son from my side while I was asleep, and 
lay him in her bosom, and her dead son she laid in my bosom. when I got 
up in the morning to nurse my son, behold, he was dead!  But when I 
observed him (later on) in the morning, I realized that he was not my son 
to whom I had given birth!’ 
The other woman (#2) replied: ‘It is not so! My son is the live one and 
your son is the dead one!’ 
The first woman (#1) responded: ‘It is not so! Your son is the dead one 
and my son is the living one!’ 
They argued before King Solomon. 
King Solomon said: ‘this woman (#2) claims “‘My son is the live one and 
your son is the dead one, “‘and this woman (#1) claims “‘Your son is the 
dead one and my son is the living one!”‘‘ 
King Solomon said, ‘Bring me a sword!’  So they brought a sword before 
the King. The King said, ‘Cut the living child in two, and give half to one 
and half to the other’ 
5
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Historically, a good deal of formal litigation in the English 
legal system occurred or was divided between two courts: “the 
common law” or “law” courts, and “the Chancery” or, “equity” 
courts.13  Although the two systems were complementary, the law and 
equity courts each had their own discrete procedural system, 
jurisprudence, and viewpoint.14  Indeed, a critical difference between 
a “court of law” and the “chancery courts” was that the law courts 
required juries,15 which the latter did not.  Moreover, the common law 
procedure, which was more formalized, was consequently scorned, so 
much so that in the past, both the legal and lay communities were 
inclined to discount its expansion to meet the vital needs of the day.16  
On the other hand, chiefly during the twentieth century, equity, in the 
United States, was promoted in a manner that obscured the principal 
shortcomings of its procedural model. 17 
B. The Juxtaposition of the Law and Equity Courts 
The common law’s law courts had three distinguishing 
characteristics: (1) the writ, or formulary system, (2) the jury, and (3) 
 
The woman (#2) turned to the King, because her compassion was aroused 
for her son, and said: ‘Please my Lord, give her the living child and do not 
kill it!’ 
But the other woman (#1) said: ‘Neither mine nor yours shall he be. Cut!’ 
The King spoke up and said: ‘Give her (#2) the living child, and do not 
kill it, for she is his mother!’  All of Israel heard the judgment that the 
King had judged.  They had great awe for the King, for they saw that the 
wisdom of God was within him to do justice. [I Kings 3:16 – 2l7]. The 
woman was rightfully awarded custody of her son. 
13  Stephen N. Seubrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 UNIV. PENN. L. REV 909, 914 (1987). 
14  Id. 
15  On the jury system and its development see GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN, A 
SHORTENED HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1987).  The authors of the United States Constitution 
preserved this right in the 6th Amendment, which provides in pertinent part: “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
jury. . .”; and in civil cases the 7th Amendment states: “In suits at common law, where the 
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury. . . .”  See The Bill 
of Rights: What Does it Say?, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, https://www.archives. gov/founding-
docs/bill-of-rights/what-does-it-say (Oct. 12, 2016).  A modern example of a chancery court 
is Delaware’s Court of Chancery.  See, e,g,, The Delaware Court of Chancery 
https://courts.delaware.gov/chancery. 
16  Seubrin, supra note 13, at 914. 
17  Id. 
6
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the single issue pleading.18  The “law” court’s procedures, as noted 
above, were inflexible and formalistic, while those in the chancellery 
courts were not.  Moreover, as noted above, unlike the law courts, the 
chancellery courts had no jury trials – as they were not seised with the 
jurisdiction to hold jury trials – cases were heard by a chancellor.  Each 
developed in Great Britain “between the thirteenth and sixteenth 
centuries and later influenced legal development in America.  Each 
represented a means of confining and focusing disputes, rationalizing 
and organizing law, and applying rules in an orderly, consistent, and 
predictable manner.”19  
As for equity, “[s]ubjects of the king, desirous of royal aid, 
would bring grievances to the Chancellor, who served as the king’s 
secretary, adviser, and agent.  The Chancellor’s staff, the Chancery, 
sold writs, ‘royal order(s) which authorized a court to hear a case and 
instructed a sheriff to secure the attendance of the defendant.’” 20  
Indeed, “[o]ver time, ‘plaintiffs could not get to the court without a 
chancery writ, and the formulae of the writs, mostly composed in the 
thirteenth century to describe the claims then commonly accepted, 
slowly became precedents which could not easily be altered or added 
to.’” 21  Furthermore, these writs increasingly began to convey an idea 
of what factual circumstances would allow, or yield a given outcome 
or remedy.  By the fourteenth century, a systematic body of substantive 
equitable principles evolved from the writs.22  Nevertheless, “[t]he 
contemporary English historian, Milsom, explains that one cannot find 
the precise beginning of the Equity Court, for, in a sense, it had been 
there all along. 
Like all English colonies, the United States adopted the 
common law, also known as case law, as it was developed by judges 
in England.  In so doing, it embraced a system, based upon the 
decisions and precedents established by those judgments.  
 
18  Id. (citing S. F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 26-46 
(1969)).  “The three Central law courts were King’s Bench, Exchequer, and Common Pleas.”  
For a description of these courts, see id. at 20-22; see also THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A 
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 139-56 (5th ed. 1956). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. (citing MILSOM, supra note 18, at 22). 
21 Id. (citing MILSOM, supra note 18, at 25). 
22 Id. (citing SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 
(1886)). (“[Indeed] so great is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions in the infancy of the 
Courts of Justice, that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the 
interstices of procedure . . . .”).  
7
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Consequently, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a 
separate common-law system evolved and developed in the United 
States.  This unique body of rules of decision was anchored in 
judgments or verdicts based on precedents, or stare decisis.23  
However, the law courts in America, as in England, were not always 
competent to adjudicate certain classes of disputes.  For example, when 
unusual questions come before a court, and it is unable to resolve it 
employing prevailing statutes or written rules of law, judges would 
have to turn to their sister equity courts for the resolution of the case.  
Today, however, that is not an issue, certainly not in the federal court 
system, as the law courts and equity courts were merged in 1938.24 
III. EQUITY DEFINED 
Equity is a set of legal principles in jurisdictions that follow the 
English common law tradition.25  Indeed, equity complements the law 
court’s rules26 and affords courts wide discretion in applying justice in 
 




REASONS AND IMPORTANCE OF THE RULE.-The policy of the 
courts, and the principle upon which rests the authority of judicial 
decisions as precedents in subsequent litigations, is embodied in the 
maxim, Stare decisis et non quieta movere-to abide by the precedents and 
not to ‘disturb settled points.  Its meaning is, that when a point of law has 
been once solemnly and necessarily settled by the decision of a competent 
court, it will no longer be considered open to examination, or to a new 
ruling, by the same tribunal or those which are bound to follow its 
adjudications. 
Id.  
24  In 1934, Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, under that authority the 
United States Supreme Court, ratified uniform rules of civil procedure for the federal courts.  
One of the changes that the Court made in those rules, was the elimination of the two court 
system.  The 1938 rules combined the rules of both, actions at law and actions in equity, into 
one body: The Rules of Civil Procedure.  See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Merge Equity 
and Common Law, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (Sept. 16, 1938), https://www.fjc.gov/history/ 
timeline/federal-rules-civil-procedure-merge-equity-and-common-law; THE RULES ENABLING 
ACT OF 1934, ch. 651, Pub. L. No. 73–415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072). 
25 “The Common Law has changed a good deal since the beginning of our series of 
[Massachusetts] reports, and the search after a theory which may now be said to prevail is very 
much a study of tendencies.”  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
26  Jurisdiction: Equity, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/jurisdiction-equity. 
The framers of the Constitution granted the federal courts jurisdiction over both common-law 
actions and suits in equity.  Equity was a centuries-old system of English jurisprudence in 
8
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accordance with natural law.27  Equitable remedies originated in 
reaction to the inflexible procedures of the English “law” courts.  
Frustrated plaintiffs turned to the Norman Kings when they were 
unable to “procure” the outcomes that they required to continue 
living.28  Consequently, at some point between the 11th and 12th 
centuries, the King established the Court of Chancery, so justice could 
be done when the law courts were unable to resolve an issue.  However, 
the equity principles as administered in England were never intended 
to create a new body of law,29 but rather, were introduced for the 
purpose of assisting and giving effect to the general laws of the realm.  
In fact, an essential maxim, which is frequently stated, is that “equity 
follows the law.”30  Its Latin form is “aequitas sequitur legem.”  A 
similar maxim is “equity follows the law, but does not control it.”31  
The purpose of equity is to support the common law and carry it into 
practical effect32 
 
which judges-based decisions on general principles of fairness in situations where rigid 
application of common-law rules would have brought about injustice. Judges exercised 
equitable jurisdiction based on a distinct set of procedures. 
Id.  
27  See generally PAUL HELM, EQUITY, NATURAL LAW, AND COMMON GRACE Chapter 12 
(2004). 
28  Penny Tucker, The Early History of the Court of Chancery: A Comparative Study, 115 
THE ENG. HIST. REV. 791 (2000); William Lindsay Carne, A Sketch of the History of the High 
Court of Chancery from Its Origin to the Chancellorship of Wolsey, 13 VA. L. REG. 391 (1927). 
29  See generally SNELL’S EQUITY (John McGhee ed., 32nd ed. 2010). 
30 Hedges v Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893) (citing Magniac v. Thomson, 15 How. 
283, 299 (1854), declaring “that wherever the rights or the situation of parties are clearly 
defined and established by law, equity has no power to change or unsettle those rights or that 
situation, but in all such instances the maxim equitas sequitur legem is strictly applicable.”). 
31 See, e.g., Beall v. The Surviving Executors of John Fox, 4 Ga., 425 (1848).  
The principles of equity, as administered in Great Britain, were never 
intended to create a new lato, but were introduced for the purpose of 
assisting and giving effect to the general laws of the realm.  Equity 
follows the law, but does not control it.  The office of Equity is to 
protect and support the Common Law, and carry it into practical effect, 
to secure its protecting influence for the benefit of the subject, whereby 
reason of its universality it would fail to accomplish that object. 
Id.  
32  Id.  For example, the court held in Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U.S. 557, 569 (1869), that:  
A party does not forfeit his rights to the interposition of a court of equity 
to enforce a specific performance of a contract if he seasonably and in 
good faith offers to comply, and continues ready to comply, with its 
stipulations on his part, although he may err in estimating the extent of his 
obligation.  It is only in courts of law that literal and exact performance 
is required. (emphasis added). 
Id.  
9
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Thus, in the 1927 decision of Reel v. Combes, the Ohio Court 
of Appeals explained equity as follows: 
It is the general principles of equity, which are 
based upon the equalization of burdens and benefits.  
This principle is founded in the common law.  This 
equitable obligation to contribute is unchallenged in the 
law . . .  in all jurisdictions.  Thus, it becomes a matter 
for determination by a court of equity, and the rule 
governing the courts, well established in all 
jurisdictions, is that recovery by way of contribution 
depends upon proportion of liability and benefit.  
Contribution in law is the equalization in proportionate 
sense of obligation incurred and the benefit received.33 
Other courts have also described the principles of equity.  For 
example, in Wells v. Pierce,34 the court observed that equity, as a great 
branch of the law of England, was brought over by the colonists and 
has always existed as a part of the common law, in its broadest sense, 
in New Hampshire.  Likewise, in Continental Guaranty Corp. v. 
People’s Bus Line, Inc.,35 the court declared  
[w]e are of the opinion that the principles of 
equity formed a part of the common law adopted at the 
time of the Revolution.  These principles as 
administered in Great Britain were never intended to 
create a new law but were introduced for the purpose of 
assisting and giving effect to the general laws of the 
realm.  Equity follows the law, but does not control 
it.”36  
Similarly, in Campbell v. Colorado Coal & Iron Co.,37 the 
court noted “[w]e use the term ‘common law’ in its broader sense, as 
including those doctrines of equity jurisprudence which have not been 
expressed in legislative enactments.”38  Finally, the Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 4(2) (2011) provides that 
“[a] claimant otherwise entitled to a remedy for unjust enrichment, 
 
33  Rell v. Combes, 25 Ohio App. 476, 479, 159 N.E. 133, 135 (1927). 
34  Wells v. Pierce, 27 N.H. 503, 512 (1853). 
35  Continental Guaranty Corporation v. Peoples Bus Line, 31 Del. 595, 117 A. 275, 279 
(Del. Super. Ct. 1922). 
36  Id. at 31 Del. 605, 117 A. 279. 
37  Campbell v. Colorado Coal and Iron Co., 9 Colo. 60, 64, 159 N.E. 133, n. 33.(Colo. 
1886). 
38  Id. at 64, 10 P. at 250. 
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including a remedy originating in equity, need not demonstrate the 
inadequacy of available remedies at law.” 
Accordingly, as utilized and defined herein, equity refers to a 
“sense of considerations of fairness, reasonableness, and policy often 
necessary for the sensible application of the more settled rule of law.”39  
Indeed, equity, by its nature, requires a balancing of interests.40    
However, the question should be, is the use of equity fair and 
reasonable to both parties?  And, is the court or tribunal effective when 
it employs equity in resolving a dispute?  The answer to that question 
is both yes, and no, depending on the facts of the case.  Courts have, 
of course, demonstrated that they can be fair, reasonable, and 
sensible.41 
Nevertheless, the principles of equity are not solely confined to 
the common law system.  It is an essential doctrine that is routinely 
utilized by international adjudicative bodies, or quasi-international 
courts, e.g., the United States Supreme Court, when it adjudicates 
transboundary water disputes between the several states.42  “Indeed, 
equity is the hallmark of transboundary water disputes.  For example, 
in adjudicating these conflicts, unless a treaty governs the allocation of 
the resource, the default mechanism is the equitable doctrine of 
equitable allocation.”43 
Moreover, recently introduced instruments, including the 1997 
United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, also include equity and equitable 
 
39  IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (5th ed. 1998). 
40  Rell, supra note 33, at 479, 159 N.E. at 133.  
41 BROWNLIE, supra note 39, at 25. 
42 See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (“As Kansas thus recognizes the right 
of appropriating the waters of a stream for the purposes of irrigation, subject to the condition 
of an equitable division between the riparian proprietors, she cannot complain if the same rule 
is administered.”) (emphasis added).  For a discussion of the equities between Kansas and 
Colorado, see generally Itzchak E. Kornfeld, Kansas v. Colorado: State Sovereignty and the 
Equitable Allocation of Water, in WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND THE LAW (Erkki J. 
Hollo, ed. 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3168284; see also, 
Rhett B. Larson, Law in the Time of Cholera, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1271 (2017), 
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol92/iss3/6.  (“Yet water law focuses primarily on two 
agendas.  First, the ‘Blue Agenda’ aims to provide an equitable allocation of water to 
individuals and communities while encouraging sustainable water management.  Second, the 
‘Green Agenda’ aims to efficiently protect water in the natural environment from pollution.”) 
(emphasis added.) 
43 ITZCHAK E. KORNFELD, TRANSBOUNDARY WATER DISPUTES: STATE CONFLICT AND THE 
ASSESSMENT OF THEIR ADJUDICATION 47 (2019). 
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principles, such as equitable and reasonable utilization.44  These 
principles have also been incorporated in international case law. 45 
A. Types of Equitable Relief 
1. The Injunction 
In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, a 1945 case, the United States 
Supreme Court held, that in spite of the changes fashioned by Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 46 and its Erie Doctrine, “federal courts may 
continue to rely on these traditional principles of equity, in order to 
ascertain whether equitable relief, such as injunctions, is available 
even in cases arising under state law.” 47  “ 
In 2006, in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 48  the Supreme 
Court expressed its now-familiar four-factor test for conferring 
injunctive relief, which the Court asserted resulted from principles 
traditionally utilized by the English Court of Chancery. 49 
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas, declared that:  
According to well-established principles of 
equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must 
satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such 
relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: 
 
44 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997); G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 99th mtg., UN Doc 
A/RES/ 51/229 (1997) (Entered into force on 17 August 2014. GA Res. 51/229, annex, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/51/49)), 
at Art. 5, Equitable and Reasonable Utilization and Participation.  See also Convention on the 
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 1936 UNTS 269; 
31 ILM 1312 (1992) at Art. 2(c) (To ensure that transboundary waters are used in a reasonable 
and equitable way . . . .”). 
45 Krishna Water Tribunal II, Report and Decision: In the Matter of Water Disputes 
Regarding the Inter-State River Krishna and the River Valley Thereof, Between 1. The State 
of Maharashtra; 2. The State of Karnataka; and 3. The State of Andhra Pradesh 40 (2010)(“In 
equitable allocation, future uses requiring diversion of water outside the basin are relevant . . 
. .”). 
46 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruling, Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 
(1848) (holding that where a federal court has diversity jurisdiction, and is adjudicating a state 
claim, it must apply the substantive common law of the state where it is sitting or, a state law 
from another state, e.g., a contract is issued in another state and that state’s law applies).  In 
addition, the federal judge hearing the case, must be guided by the following: state common 
law, the decisions issued by the state courts, as well as state practice, and cannot establish 
federal common law.; Id. at 78-79. 
47 Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217 (2018), 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol59/iss1/6.  
48 See generally eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
49 Id. at 391. 
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(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) 
that remedies available at law are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury; (3) that considering the 
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that 
the public interest would not be disserved by a 
permanent injunction. The decision to grant or deny 
such relief is an act of equitable discretion by the 
district court, reviewable on appeal for abuse of 
discretion. 50 
Indeed, one commentator recently argued that the rules of 
federal equity ought to be reexamined and reassessed so that becomes 
a body of rules under which the courts can categorically and 
authoritatively function “in the absence of contrary federal statutory 
requirements when deciding whether to grant equitable relief under the 
U.S. Constitution or a federal statute.” 51   For example, Congress may 
resolve to include or exclude certain statutory rights and how these 
should be enforced, e.g., the Clean Water Act’s52  section 404 (s)(3), 
provides for the equitable remedy of injunctive relief 53 as a statutory 
entitlement. 
2. Specific performance 
During the evolution of the law of contract, equitable remedies 
were developed where damages were not an appropriate relief.  One of 
these remedies is termed specific performance.  Pursuant to that 
remedy, a court has the authority to compel a breaching party to 
perform a specific act, in order to honor its obligation under the 
 
50 Id.at 391. 
51 Morley, supra note 47  
52 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2018). 
53 Id. at § 1344(s)(3):   
The Secretary is authorized to commence a civil action for appropriate 
relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction for any violation 
for which he is authorized to issue a compliance order under paragraph (1) 
of this subsection.  Any action under this paragraph may be brought in the 
district court of the United States for the district in which the defendant is 
located or resides or is doing business, and such court shall have 
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contract.54    Recall that the purpose of contractual remedies is to place 
the nonbreaching party in the same position had she not entered into 
the agreement. 
Thus, Article II, § 2-716 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
provides that “[t]he decree for specific performance may include such 
terms and conditions as to payment of the price, damages, or other 
relief as the court may deem just.” 55  Indeed, courts may grant the 
equitable remedy of specific performance when damages will not 
provide suitable or sufficient compensation.  Consequently, specific 
performance is regarded as exceptional relief, which is awarded at the 
court’s discretion: 
[I]t must be remembered that specific 
performance is not a matter of right, even when the 
plaintiff’s evidence establishes a contract valid at law 
and sufficient for the recovery of damages.  Ordering 
specific enforcement of a contract is a matter within the 
sound judicial discretion of the court . . . .  [T]he 
plaintiff was required to show the good faith and 
equities of its own position, and the trial chancellor, in 
weighing the equities, was entitled to consider whether 
a decree of specific performance would work an 
unconscionable advantage to the plaintiff or would 
result in injustice.56 
The traditional case where the remedy of specific performance 
is conferred is in the sales of “unique goods,”57 e.g., land, a unique 
 
54 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-716   
(Buyer’s Right to Specific Performance or Replevin.). The section states, 
in part, 
Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in 
other proper circumstances. 
(2)The decree for specific performance may include such terms and 
conditions as to payment of the price, damages, or other relief as the court 
may deem just.”).  
Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Public Water Supply Dist. v. Fowlkes, 407 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Mo. App. 1966); accord, 
Green, Inc. v. Smith, 40 Ohio App. 2d 30, 39, 317 N.E.2d 227, 233 (1974).  See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST. 1981) § 357(1).  (“[S]pecific 
performance of a contract duty will be granted in the discretion of the court against a party 
who has committed or is threatening to commit a breach of the duty.”). 
57 See, e.g., Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33, 39-40 (8th Cir. 1972) (“It is 
axiomatic that specific performance will not be ordered when the party claiming breach of 
contract has an adequate remedy at law. . . . This is especially true when the contract involves 
14
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item, which is not capable of substitution, and where replacement 
damages are very difficult to calculate.  For instance, in Converse v. 
Fong, 58  defendant Helen Fong rescinded the sale of her home to 
plaintiffs, and the latter sued for specific performance.  The appellate 
court observed that “[i]f otherwise equitable, specific performance 
may be refused only if there is not sufficient assurance that the 
defendant will receive the performance promised to her.”59 
Alternatively, in Pusey & Jones v. Hanssen,60 the U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed an order in which the lower courts granted 
equitable relief by appointing a receiver to monitor the specific 
performance of Pusey & Jones, as there was no equity jurisdiction.  
There, Hanssen – a shareholder and creditor, of Pusey & Jones, an 
insolvent company – held promissory notes issued by the company. 61  
Hanssen requested the appointment of a receiver, which the trial court 
approved, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld.  But, in 
reversing the Supreme Court held that an:  
unsecured simple contract creditor has, in the 
absence of a statute, no substantive right, legal or 
equitable, in or to the property of his debtor.  This is 
true whatever the nature of the property, and although 
the debtor is a corporation and insolvent. The only 
substantive right of a simple contract creditor is to have 
his debt paid in due course. 62 
Indeed, that has been the position of a number of circuit courts 
of appeal.  For example, in the 1972 case of Leasco Corp. v. Taussig, 
the court observed that “[i]t is axiomatic that specific performance will 
not be ordered when the party claiming breach of contract has an 
adequate remedy at law. 
 
personal property as distinguished from real estate.”); U.C.C. § 2-716, (“Buyer’s Right to 
Specific Performance or Replevin. (1) Specific performance may be decreed where the goods 
are unique or in other proper circumstances”). 
58 Converse v. Fong, 159 Cal. App. 3d 86, 205 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Ct. App. 1984). 
59 Id. at 91. 
60 Id.491 
61 Id. at 495. 
62 Id. at 497. 
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3. The Affirmative Defense of Unclean Hands  
The doctrine of unclean hands states that “a party seeking 
equity must come to court with clean hands.”63  The principle of 
“unclean hands” is all about basic fairness with the aim of preventing 
an unfair result.  Therefore, the essence of an “unclean hands” 
affirmative defense is the avoidance of a result where a mischievous 
party is wrongly profiting in a lawsuit.  Accordingly, a thief who slips 
during the course of robbing a fruit store would have no claim against 
the store’s proprietor for his stumble. 
In another case, Manufacturers’ Finance Co. v. McKey,64 the 
doctrine of “unclean hands” was utilized as an affirmative defense.  
There, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the petitioner had not itself 
come into equity with clean hands. 65  Moreover, the Court noted the 
following: 
The insistence of appellant upon its claim for 
the full rate of interest plus attorneys’ fees at a 
preposterous rate, when it appeared that there was no 
more business to be done under the contract because of 
the receivership of the Company, savors too much of 
the exaction of the pound of flesh from the creditors of 
the insolvent company to be enforceable in a court of 
equity. 66 
Moreover, the Court held that the: 
‘maxim he who seeks equity must do equity’ 
presupposes that equitable, as distinguished from legal, 
rights, substantive or remedial, have arisen from the 
subject matter in favor of each of the parties, and it 
requires that such rights shall not be enforced in favor 
of one who affirmatively seeks their enforcement 
except upon condition that he consent to accord to the 
other his correlative equitable rights. But it is well 
settled, this Court said in Hedges v. Dixon County, 150 
U. S. 182, 150 U. S. 189, ‘that a court of equity, in the 
 
63 Duhaime’s Law Dictionary, Clean Hands Definition, DUHAME, (accessed Mar. 16, 2020) 
http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/C/CleanHands.aspx. 
64 Manufacturers’ Finance Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442 (1935). 
65 Id. at 446. 
66 Id. (emphasis added). 
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absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, cannot change 
the terms of a contract.’ 67 
4. Equitable Distribution of Marital Property 
A number of states provide their courts with the jurisdiction to 
“equitably” distribute marital property between the spouses.68  For 
example, New York Domestic Relations law provides that the trial 
court must “equitably” distribute property between the spouses.69   
Indeed, the equitable distribution is mandatory.  The statute directs that 
“[m]arital property shall be distributed equitably between the parties, 
considering the circumstances of the case and of the respective 
parties70 
In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the legislature, like 
New York’s, directed the courts in matrimonial actions to equitably 
divide marital property.   For instance, in § 350271 of the divorce code, 
titled, Equitable Division of Marital Property the legislature declared: 
General rule.--Upon the request of either party 
in an action for divorce or annulment, the court shall 
equitably divide, distribute or assign, in kind or 
otherwise, the marital property between the parties 
without regard to marital misconduct in such 
percentages and in such manner as the court deems just 
after considering all relevant factors. The court may 
consider each marital asset or group of assets 
independently and apply a different percentage to each 
marital asset or group of assets.72 
Alternatively, Nevada’s legislature amended its Domestic 
Relations statute in 1993 to eliminate equitable distribution, replacing 
the term “equitable” with the term “equal.”73    The legislature also 
 
67 Id. at 449 (emphasis added). 
68 See, e.g., Deborah H. Bell, Equitable Distribution: Implementing the Marital Partnership 
Theory through the Dual Classification System, 67 MISS. L.J. 115 (1997-1998); Martha L. 
Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal Rules for Distribution of Property 
at Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q. 279 (1989-1990); Sally Burnett Sharp, Equitable Distribution of 
Property in North Carolina: A Preliminary Analysis, 61 N.C. L. REV. 247 (1983).  
69 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(7) (McKinney 2018). 
70 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 236(B)(5)(c) (McKinney 2018) (emphasis added). 
71 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502(a) (West 2019). 
72 Id. at § 3502(a) (emphasis added). 
73  NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(b)(1) (1989) (amending NRS 125.150(b)(1) (1989)) 
(amended by NRS 125.150(b)(1) (2017)) (requiring that the court, “to the extent practicable, 
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deleted the equitable factors that previously were required to be 
employed by the courts in making a ‘just and equitable’ disposition of 
community property.74  Consequently, Nevada’s Supreme Court held 
that trial courts were prohibited from any further use of the term 
“equitable” and could no longer consider “equitable” factors.75  
However, a court could still make an unequal disposition of marital 
assets if it found a “compelling reason” to do so.76 
IV. JEWISH LAW AND EQUITY 
The lives of the Jewish peoples have been governed by laws 
and rules since their reception of the Torah77 at Mt. Sinai.  Indeed, they 
have been said to be “the People of the Book.”78  For thousands of 
years, “[their] culture, [their] traditions, and [their] values have been 
transmitted through [their] texts.”79  For example, the issue of 
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are said to have to fulfill 613 
commandments (mitzvot in Hebrew).80  That number, which is not 
exact, was originally mentioned in a sermon by Rabbi Simlai in the 
third century of the Common Era and is recorded in Talmud Makkot 
23b.81  The 613 mitzvot are divided into 248 positive commandments 
 
make an equal disposition of the community property of the parties”).  See also Lofgren v. 
Lofgren, 926 P.2d 296, 297 (Nev. 1996). 
74  NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(b)(2) (1989) (amended in 1993) (requiring that the court 
make a division of property “as appears just and equitable, having regard to the respective 
merits of the parties”) 
75   Lofgren v. Lofgren, 926 P.2d 296, 297 (Nev. 1996). 
76  Id. 
77  As utilized here, the Torah refers to what is commonly known in English as the Five 
Books of Moses, to wit, Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy. 
78  See generally Shraga Simmons, People of the Book (last visited Mar. 16, 2020), 
https://www.aish. com/h/sh/tat/48969071.html. (“Jews have long been known as the ‘People 
of the Book.’ Here’s Why.”). 
79  Sefaria, About Sefaria (last visited Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.sefaria.org/about. 
80  Mendy Hecht, The 613 Commandments (Mitzvot) (2020), CHABAD.ORG, 
https://www.chabad.org/ library/article_cdo/aid/756399/jewish/The-613-Commandments-
Mitzvot.htm.  “The Talmud tells us (Tractate Makkot 23b) that there are 613 commandments 
(mitzvot) in the Torah; 248 Positive Commandments (do’s) and 365 Negative Commandments 
(do not’s). However, the Talmud does not provide us with a list of these commandments.” 
81  Tzvee Zahavy, The Talmud, Bava Metzia 23b, 102, HALAKHA.COM, 
https://halakhah.com/pdf/nezikin/Makkoth.pdf 
[THEREFORE GAVE HE THEM TORAH (TEACHINGS) AND 
MANY COMMANDMENTS . . . ] R. Simlai when preaching said: Six 
hundred and thirteen precepts were communicated to Moses, three 
hundred and sixty-five negative precepts, corresponding to the number of 
solar days [in the year], and two hundred and forty-eight positive precepts, 
18
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(i.e.. dos) and 365 negative commandments (i.e., do nots).”82  
Orthodox Jews strive to fulfill each mitzvah or commandment. 
Some of these commandments include the requirement to eat 
only certain kinds of mammals and fowl,83 and from a solely kosher 
ritually slaughtered animals.84  Furthermore, the blood of the animal 
must be drained, as the Torah prohibits the consumption of blood,85 
e.g., “Moreover ye shall eat no manner of blood, whether it be of fowl 
or of beast, in any of your dwellings.”86  There is also an edict 
regarding who may slaughter an animal.  For example, the: 
Ritual slaughter is known as shechitah, and the 
person who performs the slaughter is called a shochet 
. . . The method of slaughter is a quick, deep stroke 
across the throat with a perfectly sharp blade with no 
nicks or unevenness.  This method is painless, causes 
unconsciousness within two seconds, and is widely 
recognized as the most humane method of slaughter 
possible. 
Another advantage of shechitah is that it ensures 
rapid, complete draining of the blood, which is also 
necessary to render the meat kosher. 
The shochet (ritual slaughterer) is not simply a 
butcher; he must be a pious man, well-trained in Jewish 
law, particularly as it relates to kashrut.  In smaller, 
more remote communities, the rabbi and the shochet 
were often the same person.87 
 
corresponding to the number of the members [footnote omitted] 40 of 
man’s body . . . .  
Id.  
82  Hecht, supra note 80. 
83  See, e.g., Leviticus 11:1-3:  
1. And the LORD spoke unto Moses and to Aaron, saying unto them: 2. 
Speak unto the children of Israel, saying: These are the living things which 
you may eat among all the beasts that are on the earth.  3. Whatsoever 
mammal that has a split hoof, and is wholly cloven-footed, and chews its 
own cud, those beasts, you may eat. 
Id.  
84  In order for meat to be kosher, it must be slaughtered according to Deuteronomy 12:21, 
which provides in pertinent part: “you may slaughter any of the cattle or sheep that the Lord 
gives you, as I instructed you; and you may eat to your heart’s content in your settlements.” 
85  Leviticus 7:26. 
86  Id.  (emphasis added). 
87  Judaism 101, Kashrut: Jewish Dietary Laws, at Kosher Slaughtering, JEWFAQ (2011), 
http://www.jewfaq.org/kashrut.htm. 
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These details regarding ritual slaughter are not part of the 
Torah.  Rather, they were part of the oral law and were codified in the 
Talmud and later, in the Shulchan Aruch (literally the Hebrew for the 
“set table”), which is generally referred to in English, as the Code of 
Jewish Law.88 
Finally, the Talmud at Bava Metzia 32a prohibits the causing 
of pain to animals.  It is referred to as cruelty to living things – Tza’ar 
Ba’alei Chayim, in Hebrew.  
A. The Origins of the Talmud 
In 967 B.C.E., at the age of 16, Solomon succeeded his father 
David and became king of Israel.89  The construction of the Temple of 
Solomon (Beit HaMikdash - the House or Temple of Sanctification),90F90 
began sometime later, most likely in the tenth century B. C.E. 91F91  That 
Temple – the first of two – was destroyed by the Babylonian King, 
Nebuchadnezzar II, during his army’s siege of Jerusalem in 586 
B.C.E.92F92  At war with Egypt, Nebuchadnezzar was simply bound to 
invade Judea, as he was concerned about any potential threat to his 
armies.93F93  The king exercised “a scorched-earth policy that sought to 
render conquered lands uninhabitable . . .  the Babylonians cared only 
to depopulate peripheral regions,”94F94 and thereafter to move the exiled 
 
88 The Shulchan Aruch was written by Rabbi Yosef Caro (1488-1575).  Caro resided in the 
city of Safed (Tzfat in Hebrew), located in the upper Galilee in Israel’s north.  See, e.g., 
Menachem Posner, 14 Facts About the Code of Jewish Law (Shulchan Aruch), CHABAD 
(2019), https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/4305141/jewish/14-Facts-About-the-
Code-of-Jewish-Law-Shulchan-Aruch.htm. 
89 1 Kings 1:46 et seq.  See also Yisrael Shalem, Jerusalem in the First Temple Period 
(c.1000-586 B.C.E.), BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY, INGEBORG RENNERT CENTER FOR JERUSALEM 
STUDIES, https://www.biu.ac.il/JS/rennert/history_3.html (Mar. 6, 1997). 
90 See 1 Kings 6:1 “In the four hundred and eightieth year following the departure of the 
children of Israel from Egypt, in the fourth year of Solomon’s reign over Israel, in the month 
of Ziv, the second month, he began to build the temple of the LORD.” (translation from the 
Hebrew by the author). 
91 1 Kings 5-9. 
92  DAVID B. GREEN, THE HISTORY OF THE JEWISH TEMPLE IN JERUSALEM 4 HAARETZ (Aug. 
11, 2014), https://www.haaretz.com/jewish/.premium-history-of-the-temple-in-jerusalem-
1.5256337. 
93 Jill Katz, The Relationship between the Jewish People and Yerushalayim: A Historical 
Account of the First 400 Years 27 – 28, REPOSITORY.YU (Sivan 5773 – the given Hebrew Date 
– May 2013), 
http://repository.yu.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.12202/4013/Katz_The_Relationship_betwe
en_the_Jewish_TTG%20Sivan5773.pdf?sequence=1. 
94 Id. at 27-28. 
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upper strata of each conquered land to Babylon.95  Thus, they were able 
to add new vitality to the majesty of their core region.96  Consequently, 
the Babylonians demonstrated no hesitation regarding Jerusalem or the 
Temple. 
The Jewish peoples’ sojourn in Babylonia lasted some forty-
nine years (587 – 538).97  In 538 B.C.E., following the fall of Babylon 
to the armies of the Persian emperor, Cyrus the Great, the Jewish 
people were allowed to return to the land of Israel.98   Upon their return 
from Babylonian exile, the Israelites set upon rebuilding a temple, 
which was rededicated in 515 B.C.E.99  That Temple was a precursor 
to the Grand Temple that King Herod built.100  This second Temple 
was an enlarged and considerably enhanced edifice that was personally 
supervised by Herod himself under the watchful eyes of the Romans.101  
The Second Temple was completed in approximately 20 B.C.E.102  
However, this ornate structure remained standing for less than a 
century, as a consequence of the Israelites’ revolt against the Romans, 
beginning in 66 C.E.103  Four years later, in 70 C.E., Titus, the Roman 
general in charge of Jerusalem, pillaged the temple and razed it.104 
Following the destruction of the Second Temple 
during the First Revolt and the subsequent destruction 
of Jerusalem itself, accompanied by the exile of its 
inhabitants, during the Second Jewish Revolt, in 132-
135, Judaism made a sharp turn from being a temple-
based cult that relied on daily sacrifices to its god.  It 
became a mobile faith that revolved around law and 
prayer, and whose members soon spread out around the 
Mediterranean basin, and later to more distant points. 
The synagogue replaced the single Temple, but recalled 
the sanctuary by always being physically oriented in the 
 
95 Id. at 28. 
96 Id. 
97 1 Kings 5-9. 
98 David Green, The History of the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem, HAARETZ (Aug. 14, 2014), 
https://www.haaretz.com/jewish/.premium-history-of-the-temple-in-jerusalem-1.5256337; 
see also Cyrus Helps the Exiles to Return, BIBLE GATEWAY (Jan. 24, 2020), 
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Ezra +1-6&version=NIV. 
99 1 Kings 5-9. 
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direction of Jerusalem.  Prayer took the place of animal 
sacrifices.105 
The Jewish people across ancient Israel were not only 
distraught, bewildered but also, perplexed, at the loss of the Temple, 
because that is where they celebrated the laws and rituals that governed 
their lives.  They were now exiled again to Babylon, among other 
venues.  The destruction of the Second Temple signified for the Jewish 
population that their lives were futile and inconsequential without it.106  
Consequently, for many of the Israelites, “the destruction of the 
Temple meant the destruction of Judaism.”107 
B. The Mishnaic Period 
However, into this breach jumped Yochanan ben Zakkai, often 
abbreviated as Ribaz, an eminent Jewish sage, who lived during the 
period of the Second Temple, and a primary contributor to the Mishna, 
the principal text of Rabbinical Judaism.108  Following the destruction 
of Jerusalem, he founded the Yeshiva109 in Yavne.110  Yochanan is the 
father of Rabbinic Judaism and the person who “ensured the continued 
survival of the Jewish faith after the destruction of the Temple . . . .”111    
 
105  Id. 
106 Alick Isaacs, Jerusalem 3000: Lecture 7 - The Destruction of the Second Temple, THE 
JEWISH AGENCY (Aug. 23, 2005), http://archive.jewishagency.org/jerusalem/content/23693. 
107 Id. at 2. 
108 CATHERINE HEZSER, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE RABBINIC MOVEMENT IN ROMAN 
PALESTINE 64-65 (1997). 
109  The yeshiva (plural : Yeshivot or Yeshivas) was originally established by the Rabbis of 
the first century of the Common Era, to train future Rabbis or, disciples of the Rav or Gaon, 
the head of the yeshiva, to study (or more correctly “to learn”) Jewish religious and legal texts, 
including the Mishna and Gemara.  Originally, they were founded after the destruction of the 
Second Temple, along the coastal plain and the Galilee in Palestine/Israel, and in Babylon, 
e.g., the Yeshivot in Sura and Pumbedita.  These continued in pre-World War II Europe and 
in the Levant, or Orient, which included among others, the countries of North Africa, Iran, 
Iraq and Yemen.  Today, they are K-12 schools.  With regard to American yeshivas and Jewish 
religious schools where the Talmud is intensely studied, see WILLIAM B. HELMREICH, THE 
WORLD OF THE YESHIVA: AN INTIMATE PORTRAIT OF ORTHODOX JEWRY (1982). 
110 Ancient and modern Yavne are situated on Israel’s coastal plain, some 20 kilometers 
(12.5 miles) south of city of Jaffa. 
111 Isaacs, supra note 63; Jeremy Borovitz, Yochanan Ben Zakkai and the Development of 
the Mishnah, SEFARIA (2019), https://www.sefaria.org/sheets/53250?lang=bi. 
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Yochanan ben Zakkai was followed by Rabbi Yehudah 
HaNasi,112 (Nasi was a reference to the presidents of the Sanhedrin),113 
who with his students at the Yavne Yeshiva - a number of whom 
became famous Rabbis in their own right, compiled the Mishnah, 
during the period 200–220 of the Common Era.  Initially, Rabbi 
Yehudah’s teachings were unpopular and rejected by the wider 
community.  However, his persistence and approach to formulating 
post-Temple laws safeguarded and sustained - some would say the 
unrelenting - survival of the Judaism of future generations and of 
today.114  
The teachings of Rabbi Yehudah, his contemporaries, and his 
disciples were transmitted by a long, long line of rabbis and sages,115 
down the centuries and followed the crux of what has become  known 
as Rabbinic Judaism,116 which still buttresses the structure of today’s 
 
112 With regard to the life of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, see RABBI YONASON GOLDSON, 
DAWN TO DESTINY: EXPLORING JEWISH HISTORY AND ITS HIDDEN WISDOM 
(2010); with an excerpt titled, Why Did Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi Decide to Codify the Mishna, 
OHR SOMAYACH INTERNATIONAL (2019) https://ohr.edu/4695.  For a brief discussion 
of the Yeshivot in Sura and Pumbedita, see The Geonim of Sura and Pumbedita, at Gaon, 
JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY (2019), https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ gaon.   
113 “The ancient Jewish court system was called the Sanhedrin. The Great Sanhedrin was 
the supreme religious body in the Land of Israel during the time of the Holy Temple” and for 
some time later.  Shira Schoenberg, Ancient Jewish History: The Sanhedrin, JEWISH VIRTUAL 
LIBRARY (2020), https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-sanhedrin.  See also Philip 
Blackman, INTRODUCTION TO TRACTATE SANHEDRIN OF THE MISHNAH (1963). 
114 Isaacs, supra note 63.  
115 See generally PIRKEI AVOT, English Ethics of the Fathers chs. 1-2, 
https://www.sefaria.org/Pirkei_Avot.2?lang=bi; HEZSER, supra note 108, at 64.   
116 See, e.g., Michael J. Cook, Rabbinic Judaism and Early Christianity: From the 
Pharisees to the Rabbis, 84 REVIEW & EXPOSITOR 201 (1987) (stating that the origins of 
rabbinic Judaism are found in the many “Judaisms” that coexisted during the Second Temple 
period in the land of Israel, when biblical and co-biblical texts were edited and interpreted.  
Classical rabbinic Judaism flourished from the 1st century B.C.E. to the closure of the 
Babylonian Talmud, c. 600 C.E., in Babylonia.  Among the different Judaisms in antiquity, 
rabbinic Judaism held that at Mount Sinai God revealed the Torah to Moses in two media, the 
Written and the Oral Torah.  The rabbis claimed they possessed the memorized or Oral Torah.  
Classical rabbinic Judaism is separated into different strata: tannaitic (until 200 C.E.), amoraic 
(200–500 C.E.), and saboraic (500 C.E.–7th century).  The first stage of formative rabbinic 
Judaism is represented by the Mishnah, a law code that came to closure c. 200 C.E., after the 
destruction of the Second Temple of Jerusalem in 70 C.E. by the Romans and the suppression 
of the Bar Kokhba uprising of 132–135 C.E.  Rabbinic Judaism interpreted the Torah, often 
in opposition to the priestly tradition, which was committed to the written tradition and the 
sacrificial cult of the Temple.  However, at the end of the formative period, rabbinic Judaism 
synthesized the interpretive, messianic, and priestly traditions . . .  Rabbinic Judaism continued 
to flourish in the Middle Ages in the diaspora.  Today it represents “normative” Judaism, the 
Jewish religious expression of a substantial portion of the worldwide Jewish community.). 
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various branches of the faith.117  Alternatively, the Gemara was 
compiled through debates, discussions, and deliberations by various 
Rabbis in Palestine and Babylonia – who are known as the Amorim in 
Hebrew118 – during the three hundred years following the Mishna’s 
compilation.  The focus of the Jewish sages, both in Israel and in the 
largest diaspora community of Babylonia (modern-day Iraq),  was on 
illuminating the opinions of the Tannaim.119  However, to a good 
extent, neither Talmud is chiefly a commentary to the Mishna.  Rather, 
they are an independent, or stand-alone and all-inclusive composition 
of Halacha and Aggadah.120  Aggadah is the Hebrew word, which 
literally translates as “lore or narrative,” which subsumes “the portions 
 
117 These include the branches of Orthodox Judaism: the non-Hassidic, Vilna or Mitnagdim 
– those who oppose Hassidism – group, which subsumes modern Orthodoxy and the Mizrachi 
movements, the Haradi movement, and the various sects of Hassidic Judaism.  The other 
groups/factions include the Conservative, Reform and Reconstructionist movements.  The 
main difference between the non-Hassidic movements is their interpretation of Rabbinic 
Judaism.  For example, in its simplest description, Orthodox Jews believe in the separation of 
men and women during prayers in the Synagogue, while others hew to what is referred to as 
Mehadrin – from the Hebrew to praise or exalt, but used to define an orthodox person who is 
painstakingly scrupulous in the observance of religious rites and rituals, and who believes in 
a strict or enhanced observance – where men and women will not only not sit next to each 
other in public prayer, but at all times.  Thus, on Mehadrin buses, there is complete and 
absolute segregation of men and women.  As for Hassidic Jews, they fit into the Orthodox 
division, but hew to their leader’s, or Rebbe’s, teachings.   
118 See, e.g., ISIDORE SINGER & CYRUS ADLER, THE JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA: A DESCRIPTIVE 
RECORD OF THE HISTORY, RELIGION, LITERATURE, AND CUSTOMS OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE FROM 
THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY 527-8 (1916); Ancient Jewish History: Amoraim, 
JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY (2019), https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/amoraim.   
119 Nissan Hindel, The Mishnaic Age—The Tannaim: 3488–3950 (273 BCE–190 CE), 
CHABAD (2019), https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/115257/jewish/The-
Mishnaic-Age.htm.; See also LOUIS JACOBS, A CONCISE COMPANION TO THE JEWISH RELIGION 
(1999). 
120  See generally Study Jewish Thought, Sages & Scholars, Halakhah and Aggadah, MY 
JEWISH LEARNING (2019), https://www.myjewishlearning.com/category/study/jewish-
thought/sages-scholars (stating that according to Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, Judaism has 
a traditional division of Jewish textual material into halakhah (legal materials) and aggadah 
(legendary materials) and restates the division as Jewish behaviors (halakhah) and the 
reasons/motivations for those behaviors (aggadah) . . . Halakhah represents the strength to 
shape one’s life according to a fixed pattern; it is a form-giving force.  Aggadah is the 
expression of man’s ceaseless striving that often defies all limitations.  Halakhah is the 
rationalization and schematization of living; it defines, specifies, sets measure and limit, 
placing life into an exact system.  Aggadah deals with man’s ineffable relations to God, to 
other men, and to the world.  Halakhah deals with details, with each commandment separately; 
aggadah with the whole of life, with the totality of religious life.  Halakhah deals with the law; 
aggadah with the meaning of the law.  Halakhah deals with subjects that can be expressed 
literally; aggadah introduces us to a realm that lies beyond the range of expression.  Halakhah 
teaches us how to perform common acts; aggadah tells us how to participate in the eternal 
drama.  Halakhah gives us knowledge; aggadah gives us aspiration. 
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of the Talmud and Midrash which contain homiletic expositions of the 
Bible, parables, stories, maxims, etc., in contradistinction to 
Halachah”121 (also spelled Halakhah) which “refers to Jewish law.  Per 
its literal translation, ‘the way,’ halachah guides the day-to-day life of 
a Jew.” 122 
C. History of the Talmud 
Talmudic history begins following the destruction of Jerusalem 
and the second Temple by Titus in the year 70 of the Common Era.  
During the post Temple period, there were two hubs of Jewish life – 
Palestine and Babylonia – the latter had the majority of Jews, who 
escaped following the Temple’s obliteration.  These two locales are 
where Rabbinic Judaism formed, i.e., the post-Temple Judaism; the 
one that has been practiced for over 1,850 years and continues today.123   
These two settings were also where two versions of the Talmud were 
composed. 
They are, the predominant Babylonian Talmud, known in 
Hebrew, as the Talmud Bavli, which includes the Mishnah and the 
Gemara authored and compiled by the Jewish sages of Babylonian, -  
as well as other commentaries - and the lesser utilized Jerusalem 
Talmud or the Talmud Yerushalmi,124  as it is referred to in Hebrew 
and composed in the Galilee.  In comparing the Bavli, or Babylonian 
Talmud to its counterpart, Yerushalmi Talmud, some “scholars have 
frequently pointed out that the discussions in the Bavli are more long-
winded and discursive, involving extensive explanation and abstract 
conceptualization, forced interpretations of early sources, and so 
on.”125 
The laws transmitted orally from Sinai were 
organized by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi into six orders 
containing 63 tractates, called “[masechtot”] in 
 
121 Aggadah, CHABAD (2019), 
https://www.chabad.org/search/keyword_cdo/kid/10816/oq/Aggadah/jewish/Aggadah.htm. 
122 Menachem Posner, What Is Halakhah (Halachah)? Jewish Law, CHABAD, (2019), 
(https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/4165687/jewish/What-Is-Halakhah-
Halachah-Jewish-Law.htm. 
123 HERMAN L. STRACK, INTRODUCTION TO THE TALMUD AND MIDRASH (Markus 
Bocksmuehl ed., trans., 2d ed. 1996). 
124 Also referred to as the Talmud di Venei Ma’arava, The Talmud of the Group of the 
West. See Jerusalem Talmud, THE JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY (2019), 
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/talmud-jerusalem.   
125 Id. 
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Hebrew.  The Hebrew acronym for the entire Six 
Orders is called “the Shas”, the acronym for “Shisha 
Sedarim”—the Hebrew for the Six Orders.126 
As in the previous common law section, I will discuss Hebraic 
equitable principles by example.   
1. Mishna Bava Metzia 
My focus here will begin with the Talmudic tractate, or treatise, 
of Bava Metzia in the Babylonian Talmud.  It is the second tractate of 
three, dealing with harms or damage to property, and is under the 
Hebrew heading Nezikin.127  The Bava in Bava Metzia is the Aramaic 
for “Gate.”  Thus, Gate of Finding Chattel, or Gate of Lost Objects.  
The three tractates include Bava Kama – damages: Bava Metzia – 
property rights and Bava Batra – real estate and other transactions.  The 
three are the volumes in the fourth of the six Sedarim (orders), referred 
to as Nezikin.  I will concentrate on civil harms or damages, i.e., torts. 
128  We open with the tractate Bava Metzia page 2a, and the following 
Mishnah129: 
 
126 The six tractates are: 
1. Zera’im (Seeds), dealing with prayer and blessings, tithes and 
agricultural laws (11 tractates); 
2. Moed (Festival), relating to the laws of the Sabbath and the Festivals 
(12 tractates); 
3. Nashim (Women) concerning marriage and divorce, some forms of 
oaths and the laws of the nazirite (7 tractates); 
4. Nezikin (Damages); dealing with civil and criminal law, the 
functioning of the courts and oaths (10 tractates); 
5. Ke’doshim (Holy things), regarding sacrificial rites, the Temple, and 
the dietary laws (11 tractates) and finally; 
6. Tehorot (Purities), pertaining to the laws of purity and impurity, 
including the impurity of the dead, the laws of food purity and bodily 
purity (12 tractates). 
127 In Hebrew, the root word for Nezikin is “nezek,” which translates to harm or damage. 
128 See generally Rabbi Jack Abramowitz, The 63 Tractates of Shas, ORTHODOX UNION 
(2019), https://www.ou.org/torah/mitzvot/taryag/the_63_tractates_of_shas_-_part_i. (“The 
laws transmitted orally from Sinai were organized by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi into six orders 
containing 63 tractates, called “[masechtot]” in Hebrew.”)  The “Shas” is the Hebrew acronym 
for “Shisha Sedarim”— Hebrew for the Six Orders. Id.  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, known in 
English as Judah the Prince, lived from 135 CE-219 CE.  See Yehuda HaNasi (Judah the 
Prince), THE JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY (2019), 
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/yehudah-hanasi-judah-the-prince. 
129 The Mishnah’s origin is disputed.  The minority view is that the oral law was redacted 
in 189 C.E.  See HEINRICH GRAETZ, 6 HISTORY OF THE JEWS 105 (1898).  The alternative or 
prevailing view is one expressed in the Encyclopaedia Judaica, which posits that the oral law 
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a. Case 1: Tractate of Bava Metzia 2a130 
Mishna: Two [persons appear before a court] 
and are holding a tallit [i.e., a garment].  One of them 
[John] states “I found it” and the other [Jane] says “I 
found it”.  One of them [John] says “it is entirely mine” 
and the other [Jane], says “it is entirely mine”; then 
shall the one swear that his share of the garment is not 
less than half, and the other shall swear that [her] share 
in it is not less than half; and [the value of the garment] 
shall then be divided between them. 
If one says ‘it is all mine’, and the other says, 
“half of it is mine”, he who says, “it is all mine” shall 
swear that his share in it is not less than three quarters, 
and he who says, “half of it is mine” shall swear that 
his share in it is not less than a quarter.  The former 
then receives three quarters [of the value of the 
garment/chattel] and the latter receives one quarter. 
The Mishna is interpreted and discussed by numerous 
commentators.  Among them were various Rabbis and Tannaists 
(Tannaim in Hebrew)131 who wrote and compiled the Mishna.  One 
of the most prolific commentators, centuries after the Tannaim, was 
Rabbi Solomon ben Isaac (Shlomo Yitzhaki), known as “Rashi” (based 
 
was redacted at the beginning of the third century C.E.  See 14 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, at 
319 (Fred Skolnik, ed., 2nd ed. 2007), https://ketab3.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/ 
encyclopaedia-judaica-v-14-mel-nas.pdf.  The Mishnah also preserved the teachings of earlier 
rabbis and reveals the marks of an amalgamated editing. 
130 Rav Moshe Taragin, Shenyaim Ochazin Be-Talit: Splitting a Disputed Talit, VBM The 
Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash, https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shenayim-ochazin-be-
tallit-splitting-disputed-tallit (last visited Mar. 18, 2020) (“This ruling makes the first mishna 
in Bava Metzia a bit surprising. The mishna describes the well-known scenario in which two 
people are jointly clutching a disputed article of clothing, and the mishna rules that the two 
parties split the clothing . . . ).  
  The above three paragraphs are from Tzvee Zahavy, Talmud Baba Metzia, 
HALAKHA.COM, https://halakhah.com/pdf/nezikin/Baba_Metzia.pdf.  I have separated the text 
into two separate paragraphs, each with its own case.  Zahavy’s original text contains three 
cases in one paragraph.  His version also capitalizes the entire Mishna.  The third section of 
the Mishna and the section that was left out has to do with riding an animal that was found.  
Its logic is the same as the two paragraphs above and therefore will not be addressed here. 
131  The Tannaim were teachers of the Oral Law, who lived from approximately, 70 C.E. to 
250 C.E. and are said to be direct transmitters of an oral tradition passed from teacher to 
student, until they and Judah HaNasi codified these laws in the Mishnah, among other 
compilations.  See S. Safrai, The Era of the Mishna and Talmud (70 - 640), in A HISTORY OF 
THE JEWISH PEOPLE (Haim Hillel Ben-Sasson, ed., George Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd. Eng. 
Trans., 1976).  
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upon an acronym of his Hebrew initials), who lived in France during 
the tenth century of the Common Era. 132  In his elucidation of this 
Mishna, Rashi observes that the claimant to half the garment concedes 
that half belongs to the other claimant so that the dispute revolves 
solely around the second half.133  Consequently, each of them receives 
half of this disputed half - or a quarter each.  Recall, that originally 
each claimed ownership of the entire garment.  This is the Rabbis’ use 
of equity.   
In its commentary on the foregoing, the Gemara134 asks: Why 
must the Mishnah declare that [John] says “I found it”, and so does 
[Jane]; [John] says, “it is mine”, and so does [Jane]?  Does it not suffice 
for each to make one claim?  In a response the Tosafists135 answer as 
 
132  Rashi, is one of the most significant Jewish commentators of the entirety of the Torah, 
Prophets and Ketuvim (the Jewish Scriptures comprise three books of five books of Moses, 
the prophets, and the collected writings, e.g., Psalms, Proverbs, Job and the Song of Songs) 
and the Talmud, in the history of Judaism.  Rashi was born in 1040, in the northcentral French 
city of Troyes and passed away in the year 1105 C.E.  Unlike Rashi’s commentary, the Tosafot 
(additional commentaries), were Rashi’s students and medieval commentators of the Talmud.  
Their writings took the formulation of analytical and illuminating annotations, which are 
printed, in most Talmud editions, alongside Rashi’s outer margin commentaries, are more 
comprehensive, often serving as an amplification of the Talmudic dialogue itself, and sought 
to explain the text in a sequential manner.  In many instances, we find the Tosafot quoting 
parallel texts so as to reconcile apparent contradictions.  In the Talmud the location of Rashi’s 
and the Tosafists’ commentary changes depending on the page.  On one page, Rashi’s 
commentary appears on the right side of the Mishna and the Tosafists’ commentary is on the 
left.  It reverses on the next page and returns to the original order on the next.  The foregoing 
is based on the author’s long-standing knowledge.  For a more formal explanation of Rashi’s 
life, see AVIGDOR BONCHEK, RASHI: THE MAGIC AND THE MYSTERY 1-2(2015); AVRAHAM 
GROSSMAN, RASHI (Joel Linsider trans., the Littman Library of Jewish Civilization) (2012); 
Hila Ratzabi, Sages & Scholars, Who Was Rashi, MY JEWISH LEARNING 1-4 (2019), 
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/who-was-rashi., (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).  See 
also VBM The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash, Dr. Avigail Rock, Lecture #4: Rashi 
(Part I), https://www.etzion.org.il/en/lecture-4-rashi-part-i (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).  (“It is 
impossible to exaggerate Rashi’s importance in shaping the worldview of the Jewish People; 
it may be said that after Tanakh and Talmud, Rashi’s commentaries are next in line in terms 
of their influence. One expression of this phenomenon is the fact that the first Hebrew book 
ever printed (Rome, 1469) was the Torah with Rashi’s commentary.”). 
133 Sefaria, Rashi on Bava Metzia 2a, at 2:a2, 
https://www.sefaria.org/Rashi_on_Bava_Metzia.2a.1?lang=bi (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).  
(“He admits that the half belongs to his friend and we only judge him on his half (which he is 
claiming). Therefore, (when) this one says ‘all of it is mine’ he swears etc. like the first verdict 
[i.e: the first case in the Mishnah] what they judged on him (meaning) they both swear that 
each one has at least half of it and each one takes his half.”) 
134 See Zahavy, supra note 132, at 1. 
135 The Tosafists, as noted in note 134, are additional commentators.  They were chiefly 
Rashi’s students and successors, who lived during the 200 years following Rashi’s death, i.e., 
from approximately 1100-1368.  See generally Nissan Mindel, The Tosafists, CHABAD.ORG, 
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follows: indeed, each holder of the garment makes only one claim.  
Each states, “I found it, and it is mine.”  Accordingly, the plea “it is all 
mine” is added, in order to clarify that seeing alone does not constitute 
or make a claim.  However, why would one think that it could be 
assumed that one who has only seen the garment could plead “I found 
it”? 136 
The Gemara acknowledges that the Torah’s use of the term 
‘found’ infers having taken hold of.137  However, the Tanna138 utilize 
“popular language,” in which, upon seeing an item on the road, a 
potential claimant could use the term “found it,” given the prevalent 
belief that one acquires a lost object by sight alone.  It was, therefore, 
essential to add the plea “it is all mine,” and therefore, to highlight that 
merely seeing an ownerless item cannot constitute a claim for 
possession.  
Indeed, there is a reason why the Mishna stresses the plea “it is 
all mine.”  Had it not specified that plea, one could have rightly 
declared that elsewhere in the Talmud the word “found” is used to 
denote “seen,” and therefore one would have drawn the conclusion that 
 
https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/112332/jewish/The-Tosafists.htm. (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2020). 
136 On Rashi’s commentary on Bava Metzia 2a, see generally ADIN STEINSALTZ, THE 
TALMUD: THE STEINSALTZ EDITION, VOL. I: TRACTATE BAVA METZIA, PART I at 9 (1989); THE 
SCHOTTENSTEIN EDITION OF THE TALMUD BAVLI, VOL. I: TRACTATE BAVA METZIA, (2a), Ch. 
1-3 (Rabbi Hersh Goldwurm, ed. 1992). 
137 See generally, Sefaria, Mishnah Bava Metzia 1, 
https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Bava_Metzia.1? 
ven=The_Mishna_with_Obadiah_Bartenura_by_Rabbi_Shraga_Silverstein&lang=bi.  
By law, they should divide without an oath; but the sages ordained that 
neither of them takes anything without an oath, so that a man should not 
go and take hold of his neighbor’s garment and say: “It is mine!” And it 
was necessary for the tanna to apprise us both of “I found it” — (an 
instance of) finding a lost object, and: “It is all mine” — (an instance of) 
buying and selling. For if only the first were taught, I would say that it is 
only in that case that the Torah imposed an oath, one being apt to 
rationalize to take a lost object unlawfully, viz.: “My friend will lose 
nothing. I will go and seize it and divide it with him.” 
138 Rabbi Louis Jacobs, Who Were the Tannaim and Amoraim?: The Great Sages of the 
Mishnah and Talmud, MY JEWISH LEARNING 1 (2019) 
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/ tannaim-amp-amoraim. 
The Talmudic rabbis whose views are recorded in the Talmudic literature 
are called Tannaim . . . [The term is] . . . also found in the Talmud in 
connection with learning activity.  In this context, a Tanna (‘rehearser’ or 
‘teacher’) was a functionary who rehearsed opinions and statements of the 
teachers of the first two centuries . . . [of the Common Era]. 
Id.  
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mere sight establishes an entitlement to possession.139  Accordingly, 
the Mishnah first states “I found it” and then “it is all mine” so that we 
might conclude from the additional phrase that merely seeing an object 
does not indicate a claim for possession. 
The Gemara asks a succeeding query: Should it not suffice for 
us to accept as evidence, the statement “I found it”?140  We would then 
know that he/she claims, “it is mine”!  The response is: had the Mishna 
only imparted “I found it,” one could have assumed that he/she meant 
“I saw it”; and therefore he/she acquired the garment solely by seeing 
it.  Therefore, the Mishna demonstrates that “it is mine,, in order to 
explain that a garment, or any similar chattel’s holder, does not acquire 
possession solely through seeing it alone.141 
In this Bava Metzia Mishna, we are presented with two cases 
that address the finding of a garment – or indeed, any chattel – by two 
people, who each claim to have found it and to have total ownership 
over it.  The Mishna’s description of the facts and the court’s 
equitable division of the garment resolve the dispute, i.e., Each 
receives the share that they swore they owned.  Note, however, that 
“equitable” does not mean “equal.”  Nevertheless, hidden in the text 
are a number of issues that the Mishna – and a judge – has to tackle 
and a range of fundamental rules which she must confront.  First, how 
is “possession” defined?  How is it established?  And, under what 
conditions will possession lead to ownership?  Second, by 
administering oaths to the claimants – assuming that they are not 
lying – the judge is ruling out that one or both of the claimants is a 
thief who stole the garment.  Third, we are provided with an exegesis 
of the logic that the Rabbis employed in resolving issues related to 
lost objects. 
  Masechet/Tractate. Baba 
Metzia 2b 
In chapter two of Bava Metzia, 142 the Gemara states that:  
 
139 Talmud - Mas. Baba Metzia 2a, at 1 (2019), HALAKAH.COM, 
https://halakhah.com/pdf/nezikin/ Baba_Metzia.pdf. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 4. 
142 Mishna Bava Metzia 2, Sefaria (Dr. Joshua Kulp ed.), https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_ 
Bava_Metzia.2?lang=bi. 
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if the Tanna had dealt solely with the case of 
finding I [an unknown commentator][143] might have 
said that only in such a case would the Rabbis impose 
an oath, because each disputant might permit himself 
[to claim the garment] by saying to himself, ‘My 
neighbour loses nothing through my action [as it cost 
him nothing to acquire the garment]; I shall go and take 
hold of it and share it with him.’144 
A footnote to the above states that “[t]he oath would then act 
as a deterrent, [because] even if he did not hesitate to put forward a 
wrong claim he would not be ready to commit perjury.”145  Of course, 
the sages who argued their various positions and drafted the Mishna 
and the Gemara were assuming that the claimant feared G-d and would 
not lie.  Other tractates in the Talmud address false testimony.146  That 
subject is beyond the scope of this article.  
b. Case 2: Marriage 
The Torah offers little direction with regard to the practices of 
marriage.  For example, what is the method for a man of finding a 
spouse, the dowry, the type of marriage ceremony, and the like.  These 
were likely part of the oral Torah, since the Talmud fully addresses and 
explains the character of the marital relationship. 
For instance, the Mishnah’s tractate of Kiddushin ch.1:1, 
specifies that a wife is acquired in three ways: (1) through money; (2) 
via a contract; or via sexual intercourse.  Generally, all three of these 
conditions are satisfied, even though only one is required to achieve a 
valid marriage.  In Judaism, the marriage is a contractual relationship 
 
143 Zahavy, supra note 132, Baba Metzia 2a, at the bottom of page 1, text accompanying 
footnote 6, refers to “Kadi, replied.”  Footnote 6 provides: “This word may also mean ‘an 
unknown authority’”. 
144 Id. at 2. 
145 Bava Metzia 2b at note 1.  See BABYLONIAN TALMUD: TRACTATE BABA MEZI’A, BABA 
MEZI’A 2A, Chapter I (2019), http://www.come-and-hear.com/babamezia/babamezia_2.html. 
146 Jewish law provides techniques to urge a witness not to lie.  For example, the Ten 
Commandments, provides: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor.”  Exodus 
20:16.  The peril, or caution that is provided prior to a person’s testimony, for example, 
determining the witness’s competence to testify, or that the witness has not tampered with or 
manipulated the evidence, as well as voir dire by the judge.  Indeed, caution of the legal 
penalties that will be exacted that a witness receives, for instance, in financial suits is touched 
upon in Mishnah Sanhedrin 3.6, and considered at length in Sanhedrin 29a. 
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between the prospective bride and the prospective husband.  The 
contract is called a Ketubah147 – which in Hebrew is a writing.    
The equity issue turns on the view that the ketubah is a contract 
wherein both parties are said to participate equally, thereby 
endeavoring to dismiss the appearance of the wife as the husband’s 
property.  However, a number of critics have challenged this view, 
arguing that marriage is a kinyan mamon—a monetary contract, which 
defines marriage, as a relationship whereby the woman becomes an 
acquired object.148  
The next example of the use of equity deals with an estate of a 
deceased husband.  The mishna dealing with the marriage contract, 
Ketuboth, provides the following: 
Mishna: Ketuboth 93a 
If a man who was married to three wives died, and the 
kethubah[the marriage contract] of one was a maneh [valued at 
a one hundred zuz dowry], of the other two hundred zuz, and 
of the third three hundred zuz, and the estate was worth only 
one maneh [one hundred zuz], they divide it equally. 
If the estate was worth two hundred zuz, the claimant 
with the kethubah of the maneh receives fifty zuz, while the 
two other claimants of the two hundred and the three hundred 
zuz each receive three gold denarii (worth seventy-five zuz). 
If the estate was worth three hundred zuz, the claimant 
of the maneh receives fifty zuz, the claimant of the two hundred 
zuz receives a maneh (one hundred zuz) and the claimant of the 
three hundred zuz receives six gold denarii (worth one hundred 
and fifty zuz)…. Similarly, if three persons contributed to a 
 
147 Elon Gilad, The Ketubah, or Jewish Wedding Contract: Traditionally written in 
Aramaic, the ketubah details the groom’s obligations toward his future wife, HA’ARETZ Aug. 
23, 2015, https://www.haaretz.com/jewish/ the-ketubah-or-jewish-wedding-contract-
1.5390222 (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).  (“Under Jewish law, the traditional wedding ceremony 
process starts with the signing of the ketubah (Hebrew for ‘written thing’), which is the 
marriage contract . . . The ketubah is traditionally written in Talmudic-era Aramaic. More 
modern versions can be written in Hebrew, English or other languages. As the groom is 
unlikely to be fluent in Aramaic, the rabbi will read the ketubah aloud and explain what it 
stipulates.”). 
148 See generally MOSHE MEISELMAN, JEWISH WOMEN IN JEWISH LAW 96-97 (1978). 
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joint fund and they had made a loss or a profit they share in the 
same manner. 149 
 
 
Distribution of the Estate 
Estate 
value 
Wife #1 Wife #2  Wife # 3 
100 33 1/3 zuzim 33 1/3 
zuzim 
33 1/3 zuzim 
200 50 zuzim 3 Gold 
Dinarii 
3 Gold Dinarii 
300 50 zuzim 100 zuzim 6 Gold Dinarii 
 
What should be evident, is that the authors of the Mishna and 
Gemara were aware that each woman will, or may have to, fend for 
herself, if for example she has no parents.  Consequently, they divided 
the estate equitably, based on the original contract between the two 
parties. 
D. Circling Back to Basics 
One must also remember that the Mishna and Gemara always 
“circle back” to the Torah or halakha,150 i.e., Jewish Law, since the 
Torah is what is being interpreted in the oral law.  That is, these texts 
are not studied in a vacuum.  Indeed, they illuminate, expand and build 
upon Torahic laws.  As regard found objects, these are referred to in 
Leviticus 5:21-24, which declare, in pertinent part: 
 
149 The ketubah, or the marriage contract, is a requisite part of every Jewish marriage.  It 
sets forth the husband’s obligation, pursuant to Jewish law, to his future wife during the 
marriage, and his monetary duties upon death or divorce.  Indeed, two witnesses are required 
to verify, in writing, that the groom executed the ketubah.  In most run of the mill, standard 
form ketubot (plural for ketubah), the groom declares that as a husband he agrees to obligate 
himself to provide his wife, in the amount of 200 zuz and 200 zekukim of silver upon the 
occurrence of either death or divorce.  The groom places a wedding band on his betrothed 
finger, and declares the following from the ketubah, “After all, you are sanctified unto me [to 
be my wife], with this ring, pursuant to the laws of Moses and Israel.  And, I shall work, 
respect, provide for you, and sustain you in harmony with the customs and traditions of Jewish 
husbands who have worked, respected, provided for, and sustained their wives with 
faithfulness.  And I will furnish you with 200 zuzim as dowry.  Where the woman was 
previously married – divorced or widowed – or she is a convert to Judaism, the amounts of the 
dowry and additional support are halved, i.e., 100 zuzim.  However, the bride is also given a 
supplementary amount, for clothing, food, and other needs, “according to the way of the 
world.”  Note, that beyond dowry, the husband will generally leave his estate to his wife. 
150 See Walzer, supra note 1, for the definition. 
33
Kornfeld: Equity in American and Jewish Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
142 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 36 
Leviticus 5:21, “The Lord spoke unto Moses saying, if 
any one sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord, 
and deal falsely with his neighbour in a matter of . . . 
robbery    . . .; 22. or have found that which was lost, and 
deal falsely therein, and swear to a lie; in any of these 
that a man does, sinning therein; 23.  Then it shall be, if 
he has sinned, and is guilty, that he shall restore that 
which he took by robbery . . . or the lost thing which he 
found, 24.  Or anything about which he has sworn falsely, 
he shall even restore it in full, and shall add the fifth 
part more thereto; unto him to whom it appertaineth 
[appertains or belongs] shall he give it, in the day of his 
being guilty. [i.e., on the day when he makes voluntary 
acknowledgment of his guilt . . . .] 151 
The foregoing is quite different from a common law equity 
claim.  Common law equity is employed where there is no statute or 
rule to guide the court.  However, even though one reads and analyzes 
the cases in the Mishna, as many students of the Talmud do – 
particularly when they begin its study – even without referring to the 
Torah, they are aware that its rules are always in the background.  That 
is, because the Mishna, the Gemara, the Shulchan Aruch, and the many 
other commentaries on Jewish law, fill in the missing elements for a 
rule.  The following examples may work to clarify the point. 
Part of the Torah’s Ten Commandments, located at Exodus 
20:1-17, contains the commandment, which declares “You shall not 
murder” (alteration added).  Reading that commandment, one ought to 
be cognizant of numerous questions, including: (1) what constitutes 
murder; (2) how does one prove murder? (3) is murder a crime? (4) is 
it a tort? (5) how many judges are required to adjudicate a murder case? 
(6) how many witnesses are required (eyewitnesses or other witnesses 
who are competent to testify)? (7) are the witnesses testifying 
truthfully, or are they lying, or coerced, or are they colluding for their 
own gain? (8) is the act punishable at all? and (9) if so, what 
punishment, if any, should be meted out to the murderer?  These issues 
and numerous others are the province of the Talmud, and they are 
settled in the Mishna and Gemara in order to make a reasoned equitable 
finding.  The authors of the Talmud fill in these lacunae, utilizing 
 
151 DR. J. H. HERTZ, C.H., THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAS 422-23(Soncino Press 2d ed. 
1980) (emphasis added). 
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equitable remedies.  The use of equitable processes and how remedies 
are reached is addressed below. 
For example, the Torah at Numbers 35:16-20 provides 
illustrations of acts constituting murder.  In the Mishna, Makkot 
(Lashes), which is part of Nezikin (Damages), the Rabbis address the 
issue of murder.  However, they also address what is not murder.  In 
this, they are directed by the Torah, specifically, given Numbers 35:10-
13.152  That section discusses sanctuary/refuge cities.  Here, the Rabbis 
parse out what constitutes involuntary manslaughter.  The discussion 
in the Mishna shifts to accidental killing, and will be the focus here, to 
demonstrate the Rabbis’ equitable thinking.  Recall that in Biblical 
times six cities of refuge existed.153 
If a person accidentally killed another, the killer was given the 
opportunity to escape to the cities of refuge where he was protected 
from the revenge of the victim’s family, until the court could judge and 
release him from the death sentence.  Again, utilizing the Torah, as one 
must, the sages move on to determine whether a particular defendant 
on trial for murder should be put to death.  Note, how the discussion 
begins with text from the Torah, regarding murder, and as the sages 
proceed to parse out remedies, they arrive at an equitable remedy, 
based on the various factual scenarios. 
c. Case 3: Murder v. Negligent 
Homicide 
Mishna Maakot Ch. 1-2, 7b:17 
The main objective of the following is to point out how 
utilizing the logic of equity, the authors of the Mishna arrive at the 
equivalent of the crime of involuntary manslaughter.154   
 
152 Numbers 35:10-13: 
10Speak to the children of Israel and say to them, When you cross the 
Jordan to the land of Canaan,11 you shall designate cities for yourselves; 
they shall be cities of refuge for you, and a murderer who killed a person 
unintentionally shall flee there.12  These cities shall serve you as a refuge 
from an avenger, so that the murderer shall not die until he stands in 
judgment before the congregation [and repent].emphasis added. 
Id.  
153 The cities were the Galilean city of Kedesh, Schechem (Nablus), Hebron, Bezer, Ramot 
and Golan. See Exodus 21:13 and Joshua 20:7-8. 
154 MAKKOS 2a-24b The Soncino Babylonian Talmud 23 (Reformatted by Reuven 
Brauner, 5772 in the Hebrew calendar, 2018 in the Gregorian), 
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MISHNA: These are the people who go into 
banishment, [i.e., are exiled to be given the chance to 
seek sanctuary in a city of refuge].  Anyone who kills 
in error, [internal note 13: i.e., accidentally, without 
premeditation.]  Whether one is liable to be banished 
depends on the particular circumstances of the case: If 
one was rolling a roller to smooth the covering of 
mortar that he applied to [ seal his roof] [internal note 
14: Eastern roofs are flat; they are plastered to make 
them water-tight and give them the necessary slope.  
The leveling is done by a log (or smooth flat stone) to 
which a long handle attached, by which it is pushed 
backwards and forwards.]  and it [the roller] [slipped 
over] fell down and killed somebody, or if one was 
lowering a barrel from the roof and it fell on a person 
and killed him, or if he was descending a ladder and he 
fell on a person and killed him, in all these cases he is 
banished.  But if one was pulling a roller toward him 
and it fell from and it fell from his hands upon a person 
and killed him, or if one was lifting a barrel and the rope 
was severed and it fell upon a person and killed him, or 
if one was climbing a ladder and he fell upon a person 
and killed him, that unintentional murderer is not 
banished.  This is the principle: Any murderer who kills 
unintentionally through his downward motion is exiled, 
and one who kills not through his downward motion is 
not exiled. 155 
Examining the case with the rope and barrel, we note that the 
first example states: “lowering a barrel from the roof” is not punishable 
by banishment.  The reasoning must be that this is the expected mode, 
or custom, of moving the barrel from the roof to a lower elevation.  
Certainly, once a job of constructing or repairing a roof is done, the 
barrel must be removed.  Thus, the negligence in that scenario suggests 
that the barrel’s handler was acting in the mode that others, who are 
similarly situated, would lower a barrel.  However, in the second 
example: “lifting the barrel with one rope, may be inherently riskier, 
 
https://halakhah.com/rst/nezikin/38%20-%20Makkos.pdf.  The capitalized words are from the 
Mishna.  Note, the difference between Makkot and Makkos is one of pronunciation.  In 
modern/Israeli Hebrew the word is Makkot.   
155 Id. at Ch. 2 (emphasis added). 
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and may not have been the custom, or that one rope may not have been 
sufficient to raise the barrel.  Consequently, the lowering a barrel from 
the roof becomes an issue.” 
As will become clear from Gemara’s analysis, the key here is 
what we refer to today as negligence.  If the killer is negligent then he 
has the right to escape to a city of refuge.  If the murderer is not 
negligent, then he does not.  It turns on custom or intent, as can be 
gained from the following: 
GEMARA. R.[abbi] Abbahu asked R. Johanan: 
If while a person is going up a ladder, a rung giving way 
under him comes down and kills somebody, how would 
this be taken? Was the death to be considered [a result] 
of an upward or a downward movement? [internal note 
(14)] The man moves upward, the rung moves 
downward; which is the determining factor here as 
regards the law of banishment, the man’s movement or 
that of the rung?] — He replied: You have indeed laid 
your finger on [an accident resulting from] a downward 
motion as a prerequisite of an upward movement.  To 
this R. Abbahu objected [from the Mishnah]: This is the 
general principle: Whenever the death was caused in 
the course of a downward movement, he goes into 
banishment, but if [caused] not in the course of a 
downward movement, he does not go into banishment.  
Now, [what kind of case would be included in the 
general] terms of the latter principle — but if [caused] 
not in the course of a downward movement . . . if not 
an instance of this kind? — [R. Johanan replied:] 
Following your opinion, what instance would you 
include in the general terms of the first principle — 
whenever. . . in the course of a downward movement 
. . . [You could give] but one, namely, that of a butcher; 
and that instance is also within the terms of the latter 
principle, as it is taught: If a butcher whilst chopping 
meat killed somebody [there are four different versions 
of the case].  Version A [internal note (15) ) Lit., ‘One 
Tanna teaches ‘ . . . and another Tanna teaches.] has it: 
If he killed a person in front of him, he is liable to go 
into banishment; if behind, he is exempt.  Version B: If 
behind him, he is to go into banishment; if in front, he 
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is exempt.  Version C: Whether in front of him or 
behind, he is to go into banishment.  Version D: 
Whether in front of him or behind, he is exempt.  And 
[continued R. Johanan], it is really not difficult [to 
explain these diversities], thus: In Version A: If he 
killed in front by a downward stroke [he goes into 
banishment]; if behind him by an upward swing [of the 
chopper], he is exempt. [internal note (16) Although the 
upward swing behind is the beginning of the downward 
stroke in front.]  In Version B: If he killed in front of 
him by the upward swing [he is exempt]; if behind him, 
by the downward [back] movement [he goes into 
banishment]. [internal note (17) Although the 
downward back movement is but a continuation of the 
upward swing in front.]  In Version C: If he killed either 
in front or behind him by the downward movement [he 
goes into banishment]; and in Version D.’ If he killed 
either in front or behind him by the upward swing [he 
is exempt].156 
The foregoing is somewhat complicated, if for no other reason, 
because attempting to translate Hebrew – sometimes archaic – and 
Aramaic is difficult at times.  Nevertheless, when dealing with the 
cities of refuge for inadvertent murderers, one of the key issues is: what 
constitutes an unintentional, or unintended killing?  Under the law, the 
members of the family of the person who was killed are allowed to 
exact revenge, including killing the killer, with impunity, if the killer 
does not escape to a city of refuge.  However, once the killer finds her 
way into a city of refuge, the victim’s family cannot touch the killer, 
as she is provided refuge.  Accordingly, it is critical to determine the 
proper punishment: banishment to a city of refuge versus death.  Thus, 
in order for the Talmud to be fair, impartial, or even handed, i.e., 
equitable, the Rabbis must construe what kind of act is excusable and 
worthy of a right to seek refuge. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Equitable principles are not an inflexible or rigid set of rules – 
which is the law’s province – rather, they are general principles from 
 
156 MAKKOS 2a-24b, supra note 149, at 23.  
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which deviation may occur in specific cases.  Indeed, pursuant to the 
common law “[e]quity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy.”  
That is why the common law fashioned the doctrine ubi jus ibi 
remedium, or “where there is a wrong, there must be a remedy.”  In the 
Talmudic tradition, as seen above, the sages who compiled both the 
Mishna and the Gemara, also do not have hard and fast rules, whether 
dealing with lost objects, intestate estates, or killing of a human being.  
Each scenario is governed by the facts of the case.  In these two modes, 
the American and the Jewish principles are quite similar, even given 
the thousands of years between their separate development.  However, 
the Mishnaic or Talmudic tradition represents a methodology 
employed by the Sages’ interpretations, which are grounded in the 
Sages’ exegesis of the Torah.157   
Indeed, for decades secular Jewish and non-Jewish lay people 
and scholars, who may not be familiar with Jewish law, “have had the 
misconception that Jewish law is overly formal, that it gives slavish 
obedience to the letter of the law, and that it is oblivious to practical 
consequences hermeneutics [sic] of the oral Torah and an 
interpretation as well as the running commentary of the text of the 
Torah.”158   However, in distinction to the formalism of the 
examination and study of Jewish law, its scholars, particularly 
Professor Aaron Kirschenbaum,159 “demonstrate[] that the resolution 
of an actual dispute is an equitable activity.  It is not an abstract 
exercise in reasoning but a practical resolution of a problem. The goal 
is to reconcile the parties.”160 
The goal, therefore, is not to simply expose the truth at any 
price, but to settle the dispute in a way that mends the wounds between 
the litigants and within the wider community.161  In closing, the 
unquestionable difference between Jewish and American courts that 
employ equity is best described in the following: 
 
157 See, e.g., MICHAEL WILLIAMS ET AL (EDS.), INNOVATION IN RELIGIONS TRADITIONS 128-
29 (1992). 
158 Steven F. Friedell, Aaron Kirschenbaum on Equity in Jewish Law, 1993 BYU L. REV. 
909, 909 (1993), https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1993/iss3/6. 
159 Rabbi Professor Aaron Kirschenbaum, an eminent law professor at the University of Tel 
Aviv’s Buchmann Faculty of Law, was “one of the greatest Jewish law scholars of the modern 
era.”  Radzyner School of Law, Conference Held in Memory of Prof. Aaron Kirschenbaum 
z”l, IDC HERZLIYA [Israel] (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://www.idc.ac.il/en/whatsup/pages/kirschenbaum-memorial.aspx.  
160 Friedell, supra note 158, at 912.  
161 Id.  
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Jewish courts can proceed under the method of 
strict law or by the method of compromise if authorized 
by the parties.  Compromise means that the court will 
impose a solution that differs from the requirements of 
strict law and will respond to the “equities” and special 
features of the particular case.  [Footnote omitted].  
Unlike the American system of trial, which considers 
the adversary system to be the best method for 
uncovering the truth, the Jewish system is more dubious 
about the ability of witnesses and fact finders to 
determine what actually happened.  In addition, the 
Jewish system recognizes that the dispute over what 
happened may play only a small part in the complex 
relationship between the parties.162 
 
 
162 Id. at 912-13. 
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